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TORTS
In Rousey v. Rousey, 1 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether an unemancipated minor child could sue his or
her parent for negligence. In an opinion written by Judge Terry, the court
reversed the trial court by declining to adopt the parental immunity doctrine
as the law of the District of Columbia.2 In so doing, the court of appeals
further eroded the fragile foundation upon which the doctrine of parental
immunity rests, 3 but its carefully worded opinion stopped short of an absolute rejection.4
The case arose from an automobile accident involving the appellee, Doris
Rousey, and her daughter, Cheryl Rousey.5 Through her father, Cheryl
brought a negligence suit against her mother for injuries sustained in the
crash.6 Mrs. Rousey's insurer, Government Employees Insurance Company, filed a summary judgment motion setting forth the doctrine of parental immunity as a bar to Cheryl's suit.7 After the trial court granted
summary judgment, Mr. Rousey appealed on behalf of his daughter.'
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals traced the origins of parental
immunity back to 1891 in the case of Hewlett v. George.9 There, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision involving a minor
1. 499 A.2d 1199 (D.C. 1985).
2. Id. at 1200.
3. The law concerning parental immunity is slowly unraveling through limitation and
abrogation. See, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971)
(complete abrogation); Fitzgerald v. Valdez, 77 N.M. 769, 776, 427 P.2d 655, 659 (1967)
(emancipated children may maintain an action); Teramano v. Teramano, 6 Ohio St. 2d 117,
216 N.E.2d 375 (1966) (allowing recovery for intentionally inflicted injuries); Winn v. Gilroy,
296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984) (abrogating broad doctrine of parental immunity in favor of
an inquiry into whether the nature of the parent's act is tortious or privileged); Felderhoff v.
Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928, 930-31 (Tex. 1971) (parental immunity does not extend to an
employer-employee relationship); see also Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine in
Search of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489 (1982); Comment, Child v. Parent. Erosion
of the Immunity Rule, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 201 (1967-68).
4. The court stated, "the parental immunity doctrine would serve no valid purpose in an
automobile negligence case ... in which the parent ... has liability insurance." Rousey, 499
A.2d at 1202.
5. Id. at 1200.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) (The Mississippi Reporter spells the first party's name
in this case "Hewlett." The Southern Reporter, however, spells the name "Hewellette." This
article follows the official state reporter.).
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daughter's false imprisonment suit against her mother for wrongfully committing her to an insane asylum."° The court reasoned that "[t]he peace of
society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families" 1 ' would be disrupted by permitting children to maintain suits against their parents. The Hewlett court cited
no authority for its bold assertion.12 However, for almost eight decades following Hewlett, the majority of American jurisdictions invoked the parental
immunity doctrine. 3
The United States District Court, in Dennis v. Walker, 14 was the first
court with jurisdiction over the District of Columbia to address directly' 5
the issue of parental immunity. In discovering that the issue of parental
immunity had never been determined authoritatively in this jurisdiction,' 6
the district court traced the development of the parental immunity doctrine
in other jurisdictions.' 7 The court concluded that the overwhelming majority of decisions favored parental immunity in tort suits brought by unemancipated minor children.' 8 Thus, the court proceeded to initiate the doctrine
of parental immunity in the District of Columbia.
Until Rousey, the District of Columbia courts had not had the opportunity to reconsider the parental immunity doctrine since the Dennis decision.
In the intervening years, however, a decisive trend toward abrogation or lim10. Hewlett, 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
11. Id. The Hewlett court further stated that a child's only legal protection "from parental violence and wrongdoing" lay with the state's criminal law system. Id. The value of promoting domestic tranquility through parental immunity has often proven hollow. See, e.g.,
Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (denying recovery against a father who had
raped his minor daughter).
12. Ironically, the few cases concerning parent-child torts prior to Hewlett v. George indicate parental liability. See, e.g., Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885) (failure
of guardian in loco parentis to properly clothe minor child justifies action for negligence); see
also McCurdy, Torts Between Personsin Domestic Relation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1030, 1059-63
(1930).
13. It was not until 1963 that Wisconsin became the first state to substantially abrogate
parental immunity. Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963). The majority of
jurisdictions currently continue the erosion of this once-entrenched doctrine. See generally
Hollister, supra note 3, at 528-32; Comment, The Demise of Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 12
WILLAMETTE L.J. 605, 614-21 (1976).
14. 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968).
15. In Villaret v. Villaret, 169 F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1948), the federal court of appeals
ruled that the parental immunity doctrine prevented an unemancipated minor from suing his
mother for injuries suffered in an automobile accident under Maryland law. The court expressly declined to determine the propriety of parental immunity under District of Columbia
law.
16. Dennis, 284 F. Supp. at 415.
17. Id. at 415-17.
18. Id. at 417.
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itation of the parental immunity concept has developed in other jurisdictions.1 9 This trend reflects a "growing judicial distaste for a rule of law
which in one sweep disqualified an entire class of injured minors."2
In Rousey, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals disagreed with the
Dennis court on two of the doctrinal underpinnings for preserving parental
immunity. First, the court attacked the premise that parental immunity promotes family harmony. 2' The court noted that the defendant parent's insurance carrier would often satisfy any adverse judgment, thus relieving the
parents of the direct financial consequences resulting from injuries sustained
by their children.22 This view recognizes that the true adversaries in this
type of lawsuit are the insurance carrier and the family, not the parent and
the child. 23 "Far from being a potential source of disharmony, the action is
more likely to preserve the family unit in pursuit of a common goal-the
24
easing of family financial difficulties stemming from the child's injuries.",
Second, the court of appeals recognized, as did the Dennis court, the potential for family collusion in attempts to defraud insurance carriers. 25 The
court declared, however, that the possibility of fraud exists to a certain degree in every case and cannot justify a "blanket denial of recovery for all
minors."'26 The court observed that insurance investigations, juries, and trial
judges all function in the fact finding process to minimize the risk of fraud.2 7
The Rousey court's cautious advance into the often volatile realm of domestic relations represents a positive step toward ensuring adequate legal
protection for children. However, the basic contours of the parental immunity doctrine in the District of Columbia remain undefined. The Rousey
19. See supra notes 3, 13.
20. Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 918, 479 P.2d 648, 650, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290

(1971).
21. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202.

22. Id.
23. Id.; see also Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975)
(abrogating parental immunity doctrine to extent of defendant parent's automobile liability
insurance coverage); Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 88, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (allowing
unemancipated minor's right of action for injuries sustained in negligently driven automobile
where parent driver covered by liability insurance).
24. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202 (quoting Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. at 362, 339
N.E.2d at 914); see also Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 482, 174 N.E.2d 718, 724, 215
N.Y.S.2d 35, 43 (1961) (declaring that a child's "pains must be endured for the peace and
welfare of the family is something of a mockery"); Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu,
51 Haw. 484, 488, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1969) ("[W]hen a wrong has been committed, the
harm to the family relationship has already occurred; and to prohibit reparations can hardly

aid in restoring harmony.").
25. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202.
26. Id. (quoting Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. at 364, 339 N.E.2d at 915).
27. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202.

1156

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 35:1153

court gave no indication as to whether it would reject or adopt immunity in
cases where a parent is not covered by liability insurance. A bolder decision
would have helped to clarify the nature of parents' duties, rights and discre-

tion concerning their children. 28 Perhaps the unstated policy behind the
court's deliberate approach is a hesitancy to create a new field of "parental

malpractice" in an already overly litigious society. It seems that the Hewlett
court's concern for the "repose of families and the best interests of society" 2 9
still echoes today.
Having dismantled the general principles of parental immunity, the
Rousey decision follows the judicial current of the last twenty years toward
preventing the injustice of leaving negligently injured children without a recovery.3 ° However, in limiting its holding to situations where the defendant
parent is covered by liability insurance,31 the court's decision presents an
inherent danger. Can parents who are unable to bring themselves under the

umbrella of an insurance policy act negligently toward their children with
impunity? The answer to this troublesome question, according to the court
of appeals, must await resolution "for another day."32
Thomas A. Montminy

28. Among others, the court could have chosen one of three approaches dominant today.
The first approach, announced in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963)
abrogates parental immunity except "(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of
parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise
of ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical
and dental services, and other care." Id. at 404, 122 N.W.2d at 198. The second approach
asks "what would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar circumstances?" Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (emphasis
in original). Recently, some states have begun to follow a third policy enunciated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895(G) (1979). This rule states:

(1) A parent or child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason
of that relationship.
(2) Repudiation of general tort immunity does not establish liability for an act or
omission that, because of the parent-child relationship, is otherwise privileged or is
not tortious.
See, e.g., Winn v. Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 730, 681 P.2d 776, 784 (1984). Each of these approaches suggests that the only proper use for parental immunity consists of protecting parents
while performing those duties that society deems appropriate.
29. Hewlett, 68 Miss. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
30. See supra notes 3, 13.
31. Rousey, 499 A.2d at 1202.
32. Id. at 1202 n.7.

